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# Japan Report

(FOUO 1/81)



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MILITARY

DEFENSE EFFORTS, POLICIES ASSESSED

Tokyo KOKUBO in Japanese Nov 80 pp 8-21

[Article by Shiro Odamura: "Is Japan Making Efforts on National Defense?"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Ito, who came to the United States last September to attend the UN General Assembly, met with both the secretaries of state and defense on 19 September 1980. As far as defense matters are concerned, the newspapers have reported that the following transpired in the meetings. The U.S. side briefed that the Western camp must make further efforts on national defense to meet the increasing Soviet military power, that the United States cannot confine its defensive capability to only Europe and Asia but it must also extend to the Middle East, that it will be saddled with increased deficits of several billions of dollars to dispatch a task force, built around two aircraft carriers, to this area, etc. To Japan, the United States requested that "steady and significant" defense effort be made on a "long-range and continuous basis," and for the moment, in terms of concrete actions, to accelerate by 1 year the Defense Agency's "Medium-Term Operation Estimate." In reply, the foreign minister is reported to have said that: (1) a 9.7 percent increase in defense expenditures was specially approved in the budget request estimates for the next fiscal year and maximum efforts are being made; (2) it is making efforts to provide economic aid to developing countries and to countries in the conflict areas; and (3) that having the consensus of the people is necessary to increase defense spending. The handling of the defense expenditures has become a diplomatic issue between the United States and Japan but how do the Japanese think about this problem?

1. Are the U.S. Requests Unreasonable?

How should Japan react to the foregoing U.S. requests? On 14 January 1980, with respect to the request to increase defense spending by Defense Secretary Brown, who visited Japan on his return trip from the PRC, former Prime Minister Ohira is reported to have shown a cautious attitude, saying, "Probably, there are changes in the international situation. The state of economics and finances in Japan must also be considered. As far as defense is concerned, the consensus of the people is necessary. I want to handle it as a domestic problem of Japan." (14 January evening edition of NIKKEI newspaper.) I want to believe that this type of attitude has been corrected but the Japanese Government's response is not quite definite. It is lacking a clear-cut expression of intention as to whether or not it will meet the U.S. demands. I want to examine, in the rest of this article, the propriety of U.S. requests and Japan's position.

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First, Article 3 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty specifies that, "The parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack." In other words, the development and enhancement of defense capability are treaty obligations of both Japan and the United States. Therefore, it is a natural right for a party to the treaty to request its partner country to fulfill its obligation and the latter must respond to it with sincerity.

Secondly, Article 5 of the Security Treaty stipulates that, "Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." Needless to say, an armed attack against "territories under the administration of Japan" is a violation of Japan's sovereignty and an act of aggression. That is, the United States has an obligation to defend Japan against invasion and for the United States, which is trying faithfully to carry out treaty obligations, to demand that Japan make defense effort is an apparent right.

On the other hand, in its "National Defense Program Outline" ["Outline"] (adopted at a cabinet meeting in October 1976), Japan denotes that "against nuclear threats, it will rely on U.S. nuclear deterrent power," that "as a matter of principle, it will independently repel limited, small-scale aggression," and that against larger scale aggression, it will "seek U.S. assistance in repelling the attack." Japan recognizes that its national safety can be guaranteed only by reliance upon U.S. military power. Thus, it can be said that Japan is justly bound to respond with sincerity to requests by an ally that has promised military cooperation which is a matter of life or death for Japan.

Thirdly, the world situation has greatly changed in the past 10 years. The United States made official requests to Japan to increase defense spending since only a year ago and the change in international affairs is an underlying reason. The various NATO countries have already adopted a "long-term defense plan" and agreed to a real increase of 3 percent annually in defense spending at the summit conference held in Washington, D.C. in May 1978. It is only natural that the United States should demand that defense capability be strengthened in the Far East.

The surprisingly rapid increase of Soviet military armament and the countering defense effort of the Free World have been related in detail in the U.S. Defense Secretary's report to the Congress and in Japan's White Paper on Defense and will be omitted [from this article] but at any rate, the overwhelming supremacy of U.S. military power of the 1960's is a thing of the past and unless they jointly and earnestly make defense efforts, the Free Countries cannot cope with the Soviets. Moreover, the tense situation in the Middle East area, created by last year's Iranian hostage incident and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, activated the U.S. "swing" strategy and from early this year, caused the disappearance of U.S. aircraft carriers from Far Eastern waters. Although subject to future trends of the Middle Eastern situation, it is a fact that the deployment of U.S. military forces in the Far East has thinned out. Under these circumstances, it is only proper for the United States, which has shouldered the defense responsibilities of Japan, to ask Japan to carry its share of the defense burden while Japan should be giving serious thoughts to making its own defense effort for the sake of its own national security instead of criticizing the U.S. requests.

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Fourthly, Japan has developed its economic power. In the total GNP, Japan attained second position in the Free World in 1968 but even then, in the early 1940's, Japan's national income per capita was only one-fourth that of the United States (1965) and 31 percent of the United States (1967) in labor productivity (manufacturing enterprises). However, at present, Japan's national income per capita is nearly 90 percent that of the United States (1978), ranks first in the world in labor productivity and its share of world production of main industrial products is approaching 20 percent. Furthermore, this economic development is not limited simply to the economic flow aspect but even in stockpiling, Japan has reached a level comparable to Europe and the United States (for details, refer to the 1980 Economic White Paper). It has become impossible to exclude Japan in discussions of world economics. Out of common sense, it is difficult for the world to understand how a nation with such economic power says it can afford to spend only 0.9 percent of its GNP on defense needs. From this standpoint, too, U.S. requests to Japan for increased defense effort can be said to be just and right.

Therefore, Japan cannot refuse the U.S. demands on the grounds that it is in a financial strait. It is a fact, through, that Japan's finances are collapsing and recovery is an urgent necessity. However, financial difficulties are a common problem of various European countries and the United States and not limited to Japan. It is illogical to say that expenditures for economic cooperation can be increased but not for national defense. It should also be pointed out that Japan's taxation rate is 21.8 percent, which is markedly below that of various European countries and the United States (this is not to say that rationalization of expenditures should be neglected). In the light of this enormous economic power and the status of the Self-Defense Forces [SDF], which is described later, the U.S. request to accelerate the "Medium-Term Operation Estimate" by a year must be regarded as an extremely modest one.

James C. Abegglen, a management counsellor who is knowledgeable about Japan, reported the following in January of last year: "In spite of the fact that it is practically on the brink of bankruptcy with the decline in dollar value, the United States is making a real increase in its defense budget to protect Japan and West Germany. Naturally, the United States is engaged in military preparedness to protect itself but it should be pointed out, on this occasion, that it is maintaining a military presence to assist countries, such as Japan, which spends a ridiculously small amount for national defense." (April 1979 issue of CHUO KORON magazine.)

Fifthly, constitutional restrictions do not serve as excuses for hesitation in building up defense capability. Article 9 of the Constitution renounced war "as a means of settling international disputes," but it "did not deny in any way the inherent right of self-defense possessed by Japan as a sovereign state." "The pacifism expressed in Japan's Constitution did not specify nonarmament or non-resistance," and "for Japan to take self-defense measures necessary to maintain and preserve its peace and security must be considered as the proper execution of the State's inherent function." (Decision passed, 16 December 1959, by the Supreme Court in the Sunakawa incident.)

In Article 5 of the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, permission was given to Japan, as a sovereign country, to possess the right of self-defense, individually or collectively, as stipulated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Japan

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joined UN later in 1956). To substantiate this right, the SDF was organized in 1954 "with the main duties to protect Japan's peace and independence, maintain national security and defend Japan against direct and indirect aggression" (Article 3 of Self-Defense Law). Through the annual budget allocations and revisions of the law, defense capability has been gradually built up. In doing so, the government has taken the stand that "aside from weapons which are utilized, because of their performance characteristics, solely for the utter destruction of other countries (e.g., ICBM, long-range strategic bombers, etc.)," depending on the international situation, military technological level, etc. of the time, the maintenance of the minimum defense capability needed for self-defense is not prohibited by the Constitution.

Therefore, the 1-year acceleration of the "Medium-Term Operation Estimate" requested by the United States will not infringe upon the Constitution and there is no basis whatsoever for Japan to complain about the difficulties of building up defense power because of constitutional restrictions.

Sixthly, it is claimed that the people's consensus is required to increase defense spending (it seems that Foreign Minister Ito also said so). But what is meant by the "people's consensus?" Since it is impossible for 100 million persons to hold the same view, the principle of majority rule is used in parliamentary politics. In the Diet, what is decided upon by majority vote becomes the intent of the Diet and in turn, it is regarded as the wishes of the people. In actuality, up to the present, budget and legislative bills concerning defense have all been approved by majority vote. Since the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] gained a stable majority in the recent Lower and Upper House elections, under the parliamentary cabinet system followed by Japan, the policies of the majority party government may be said to have received the consent of the populace. Therefore, representatives of the majority party government cannot claim that the people's consensus has not been obtained (that is a renouncement of its qualification as the ruling party). If they so claim, the government and the LDP are throwing on the people the blame for not having defense policies. Such excuses will not be accepted by foreign countries.

However, since defense is the backbone of national security, it is desirable, if possible, to obtain the consensus of the entire populace and in politics, a supra-party agreement (that is what takes place in a normal country). It does not signify, in any way, a ready consent of the people. With respect to what it believes in, the government must strive to explain them to the people and the opposition parties and win over their agreement. Particularly, since defense is an inherent function of the nation, unlike economic matters, the government must strive to gain the people's understanding by fully briefing them on the actual situation and clearly setting forth the government policies. Unfortunately, one cannot believe at all that the government has made such an effort. Although it had excellent opportunities to obtain the people's consensus in the two general elections held since last year, the LDP did not make the defense problem a political issue to fight over openly. This is laziness on the part of the government and the LDP. This is strictly a domestic matter and an appeal cannot be made to the United States.

Thus, as noted above, U.S. requests on defense matters are entirely proper and modest in substance and conceivably, there is no reason at all for Japan to refuse them. This is a problem of completely different order from that of the automobile

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export issue which is said to be a cause of U.S.-Japan economic frictions or that of the U.S.-Japan Air Agreement which is claimed to be an unequal agreement. "Firm maintenance of the Japan-U.S. security setup" is a phrase inevitably expressed by succeeding Japanese prime ministers but the security arrangement cannot be strongly maintained by lip service alone. Its maintenance is possible only if both countries faithfully carry out the treaty obligations and each party performs its role as an allied country. Furthermore, the present security treaty is a one-sided one with the United States alone shouldering the responsibility for Japan's defense, and of course, it has great merit for the United States but it is a matter of life or death for Japan.

In contacts between countries, because of the differences in language, customs, national traits, political setup and moreover, racial makeup, or because of one-time conflicting interests, misunderstandings and retaliations occur no matter how close the countries might be. (For example, wasn't the Iranian oil import incident of November 1979, a confusion created by taking lightly the importance of the United States as an allied country?) Unless Japan resolves to treat the U.S. requests in earnest, the preservation of the security arrangement may become difficult and it might face the crisis of a security setup "existing in name only."

## 2. Has Japan Been Making Defense Efforts On Its Own Will?

Since the buildup of defense capability is a matter of national security, it is above all a domestic task rather than an international duty. Therefore, needless to say, it is not accomplished simply because there is a request from a foreign country but it must be carried out by Japan independently on its own free will (Foreign Minister Ito seems to have said so, too--20 September evening edition of MAINICHI newspaper). Although the firm maintenance of the Japan-U.S. security setup is mentioned, U.S. citizens cannot be expected to shed blood to protect a country which does not strive to help itself so Japan's independent defense effort is a prerequisite of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement (in that sense, to have to be asked by the United States to make defense effort is in itself, a sorrowful occurrence for an independent, sovereign nation). Actually, how much effort toward defense did Japan make until now?

At the Japan-U.S. administrative level security meeting, held in Hawaii from late June till early July of this year, the U.S. side is reported to have made the following severe criticism about the SDF: "The present defense strength is not sufficient to cope with a small-scale, limited aggression and does not even constitute the necessary, minimum deterrent power" (5 July evening edition of SANKEI newspaper). This year's White Paper on Defense touches on the shortcomings of the SDF (this can be assessed as an epochal remark but it is still lukewarm) but without being told by the U.S. side, the Defense Agency should be fully aware of them. The Ground Self-Defense Forces is poorly supplied, has weapons which are becoming obsolescent, lacks mobility, does not have enough tanks and antitank capability, being deprived of maneuver grounds and is inadequately fortified. The Maritime Self-Defense Forces lacks: ships, anti-air and antiship armament, mine warfare capability and the capability for landing and counter-landing operations. The Air Self-Defense Forces lacks: sufficient aircraft, defensive capability of bases, including radar sites, and adequate air space for training. Throughout the three services, there are: inadequacy in unified combat capability, in command communications, and in

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electronic warfare; insufficient stockpile of ammunition, torpedoes, etc.; and deficiency in intelligence capability. Shortcomings are too numerous to mention. Furthermore, emergency legislation and measures to cope with surprise attacks have not been prepared and nothing has been done yet to improve the social status of SDF officers. With the situation as it is, conducting warfare, let alone repelling invasion, might be difficult. These shortcomings must be rectified speedily and that is possible, depending on the will of the government (of course, interceptor aircraft should be equipped with missiles and naval ships with torpedoes but the government must be criticized, above all, for being derelict until today). The question is why, after 26 years have elapsed since its formation, the SDF has become so woefully defective and has been so neglected until now?

On this point, the Defense Agency itself must be criticized for its laziness (this writer, who formerly served in the Defense Agency, is one of those who feel strongly about this). For their attitude the mass media must also be criticized. Fundamentally, however, the blame must be placed on the LDP government, which has been in power for over 30 years but has neglected defense matters, because it felt secure under the U.S. military umbrella. In other words, during this period, the government has been vague about the proper role of defense in state affairs. It can be said that civilian control, in its true sense, had not existed at all.

This is true of all the administrative facets, including budget, legislation, etc., but in the following paragraphs, the problem concerning budget will be taken up. The reason is that the biggest bottleneck in building up defense capability had been the budget and presently, formulation of next year's budget is in the limelight. Also, the government's political stand can be reflected numerically by the budget.

Usually, when speaking of the functions of finances, the following three are mentioned: distribution of resources, redistribution of income and business adjustment. The first function, "distribution of resources," can be considered as the basic mission of finances. In other words, the basic functions of finances are to determine, out of the total resources produced annually through the people's economic activities, how much should be allotted to public finances, to secure this share through the public right of taxation, and to decide how much of the public finances should be allocated to which category. Therefore, in its formulation, the budget must be coordinated from an overall standpoint by carefully considering the suitability of the various policies and evaluating their priorities. Finally, it will be decided through the judgment of the government and ruling party on its political merits. Therefore, preparation of the defense budget may be said to reflect the government's political assessment.

The share of defense spending in the total expenditures of general account has continued to decline annually since the 13.8 percent of 1956 and it dropped to 5.2 percent in 1980. The increase rate of defense spending has been below that of the annual total expenditures. During this period, although defense outlays are highly political in nature, they have not reflected the highest judgment of the government or ruling party. For the first time, during formulation of the JFY-80 budget, defense expenditures could not be resolved at the ministerial level and was taken up by the triumvirate of LDP executives. Because of this situation, even if the finance authorities had a grasp of defense matters, they were forced to place low

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priority on defense expenditures. (Furthermore, the ruling party showed practically no interest in the 1st through 4th defense buildup plans and as for the approved plans, because of the budget formulation problems noted above, only the maximum buildup permissible for the 5-year period was specified and plans were never fully implemented.) As a result, the ratio of defense spending began to decline as mentioned previously.

Defense expenditures and various types of other expenditures became noticeably unbalanced. In the past defense buildup plans and in the "Outline" of 1976, it was understood that in actually carrying out the buildup plans, "the financial situation existing at the time will be considered and the implementation will be in harmony with the various other policies of the nation." However, to take the JFY-80 budget as an example, is there "harmony" when defense-related expenditures are 2.23 trillion yen as compared with the 8.2 trillion yen for social welfare services and 6.65 trillion yen for public works (expenses for local public bodies must be added to both categories)? Within the 5-year period since 1975, social welfare expenses increased by 4.28 trillion yen (109 percent) and public works expenses by 3.68 trillion yen (137 percent) while defense expenses increased by only 900 billion yen (68 percent). As a result, the level of social welfare benefits exceeds the world standard (e.g., see "Japan is the World's Biggest Welfare State" by Hachiyo Nakagawa in the August 1978 issue of CHUO KORON magazine, "Expenditures Handbook" edited by the Finance Ministry's Budget Bureau, etc.) and public works investments have wiped out the bad reputation of the past and except for parks and sewer system, attained the world level (1980 White Paper on Economy). Nevertheless, the SDF is still hampered by multitudinous shortcomings, as noted previously.

Secondly, what is the present status of defense expenditures? Broken down, expenses show that personnel and food supplies occupy 50 percent and with over 10 percent for base maintenance included, capital investment expenses such as for weapons procurement, technological development and facilities buildup amount to a little over 540 billion yen or only 24.5 percent of the total expenditures. To show how insufficient this amount of capital investment expenses is for a modern military force, comparisons can be made, although not necessarily appropriate, with large-scale economic entities such as the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation which has a JFY-80 budget of 1.5 trillion yen for plant and equipment investment and the Japanese National Railways (including the Japan Railway Construction Corporation) which has 1.32 trillion yen (590 billion yen even if expenses for construction of new RR lines are omitted). The above comparisons will give an idea as to the situation. Moreover, since Japan produces weapons on a limited scale, the unit cost is relatively high compared internationally.

However, what is inadequate is not only the capital investment expenditures. As far as personnel and food costs are concerned, it should be noted that because of budgetary limitations, the ground forces is short 25,000 men and the tri-services a total of nearly 30,000 men. It would be difficult to recruit all these men at once but without sufficient personnel, fighting power suffers. To speedily increase the recruitment rate is an urgent task but to do this, personnel and food expenses must be increased. Funds for maintenance and repair of ordnance and for training activities are also believed to be inadequate. In particular, lack of fuel is hampering unit training exercises and is a serious problem ("No Oil! SOS"

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in 30 September issue of SANKEI. Last month, when I visited the Chitose base, the command staff was complaining about this.) Training is crucial for the SDF and unless there is enough funds for training, the SDF cannot accomplish its mission.

Thirdly, almost simultaneously with the cabinet adoption of the "Outline" in 1976, the cabinet decided on the "guideline of not permitting" defense-related expenditures "to exceed" 1 percent of the GNP for the year. These two decisions are contradictory. To reach the troop strength mentioned in the "Outline," the Defense Agency drafted the "Medium-Term Operation Estimate" (so-called "Medium Operation"), a 5-year plan broken down by each year. The final year is 1984 but since the plan depends on budgetary appropriations, the buildup might be 4 or 5 years hence. Even if the "Medium-Term Operation" plan is carried out, the troop strength in the "Outline" will not be reached. Needless to say, the troop strength in the "Outline" is regarded as the "basic defensive power" and is considered the minimum troop strength needed to independently repel "small-scale, limited aggression." Why is it that 7 or 8 years (over 10 years since the cabinet decision) have passed and even that troop strength has not been reached? That is because the "Medium Operation" had to function under the restriction that "defense spending must be below 1 percent of GNP." In other words, as long as defense expenditures have this restriction, one cannot predict when the troop strength in the "Outline" will be reached. This is clearly a contradiction. As long as the troop strength in the "Outline" must be rapidly built up for Japan's defense, restrictions on defense spending must be lifted. There is no indication that the government, on its own, tried to resolve this discrepancy. On the contrary, Foreign Minister Ito is reported to have stated that the GNP 1 percent is the consensus of the people.

Since the present defense expenditures amount to only 0.9 percent of the GNP, some might think that the defense buildup will not be obstructed even if the restriction is not removed. That is a mistake. The reason is that as long as the restriction is imposed, the Defense Agency cannot draft concrete plans to reach the troop strength in the "Outline." For tasks which require a long period and long-range outlook, such as the defense capability buildup, plans are indispensable.

It should be added that the "Overall Security Research Group" is advocating that defense expenses be 1.07 percent of GNP (see the September issue of this periodical). Close examination reveals that the group is suggesting a reduction of 50 billion yen in personnel and food expenses and no change in funds for training exercises. As mentioned previously, these funds are sorely inadequate and with these calculations, the group must be called irresponsible for saying that 1.07 percent is sufficient.

Fourthly, in the budgetary requests for next fiscal year, a 9.7-percent increase was approved for defense spending over the 7.5 percent for other general account expenditures. The foreign minister emphasized to the U.S. side that this was an indication of Japan's effort toward defense but can one say that this is truly a defense effort?

An increase of 9.7 percent is mentioned but in monetary amount, this is only 216.2 billion yen. Since this is only a budgetary request, it is inconceivable that the finance authorities would not make revisions. Depending on future price trends, a considerable decrease in real value can be envisioned. As mentioned

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previously, adding a little over 200 billion yen to an absolutely inadequate budget for this year cannot be considered much of an improvement. It is not possible to compare, in the same vein, Japan's SDF which is full of shortcomings, as noted above, and the military forces of various NATO countries, which are already developed as fighting forces with combat plans to cope with various types of contingencies. What is necessary for Japan is to rapidly build up the SDF as a true fighting force and it is inconceivable that that is possible with an annual increase of only 200 billion yen plus. It is true, however, that since the procurement of armament for defense buildup and the training of personnel require a long period and furthermore, since there are limitations in facilities and other physical items, the funds required for the various years are necessarily limited. The possible increase in spending for JFY-81 would probably be limited to 300 or 400 billion yen. That this amount of increase was not approved in the budgetary request raises the question as to whether Japan is sincere in its defense effort (incidentally, the increase in public works expenditures amount to over 470 billion yen). I am positive that the answer is "no." The NIKKEI newspaper also reports that, "The request to consider defense funds as separate allocations must be seriously regarded as the 'security cost' that Japan has to pay and cannot be taken lightly even by finance authorities. Many point out that they [defense expenditures] cannot be put in the same category as others." (29 July evening edition.)

Next, is the 9.7 percent increase a special appropriation of defense funds? The Finance Ministry has approved, as special allocations, expenditures for payments of treasury bond liabilities, etc. which are absolutely required to implement international treaties. The finance authorities probably did not regard defense expenditures as special allocations. In reality, at the NHK TV broadcast on 22 September, Prime Minister Suzuki stated, in response to a question by a participant, that defense expenses were treated the same as economic cooperation and social welfare expenses and not as special allocations, such as those required by law or international agreements. If that is the case, Japan should not be able to assert to the U.S. side that special allocations are made as a defense effort. If they were truly thinking of national security and sincerely trying to grapple with the defense problem, they would not have taken such a makeshift step.

Fifthly, key personnel in the government and the LDP are making statements that raise doubts as to Japan's defense effort. For example, Welfare Minister Sonoda said in a press interview that, "I am against the argument to 'get on the bandwagon' to increase defense capability and to decrease social welfare in order to increase defense." (25 September and 2 October issues of MAINICHI newspaper.) Moreover, he made the same complaint to the director general of the Defense Agency. (27 September, NHK; 28 September, NIKKEI newspaper.) The welfare minister is free to discuss the welfare budget but why did he allude to defense and who made the argument? This is extremely rude. Why did he make a complaint against the defense director general who has no authority whatsoever over the welfare budget (the welfare minister should have been fully aware since he had served previously as cabinet secretary)? He is not only all wet but terribly disrespectful. By ignoring such remarks, can the government be said to be sincere about its defense effort and can it obtain the people's consensus on defense? Mr Noborizaka, vice chairman of the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council, is said to have made the following reply to a question by the NIKKEI newspaper: "No matter how many aircraft are procured to

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strengthen the forces, they are useless in the nuclear age so their augmentation is made merely to uphold the honor of the United States" (1 October issue of NIKKEI newspaper). These words reveal an utter lack of understanding of the defense problem and worse still, disgrace the 260,000 SDF personnel who serve on the front line of national defense. Under these circumstances, one cannot expect the SDF morale to rise or the people's defense awareness to increase.

### 3. Establish Defense Policies Exeditiously

In the foregoing paragraphs, I have explained the significance of the U.S. request to Japan and criticized the indecisive response and the lack of defense effort on the part of Japan. This writer served only briefly with the Defense Agency and is not a military expert. However, as one of the people, I cannot believe that the security of this country can be preserved under the present circumstances and do not think that Japan can surmount the tensing international situation. Furthermore, it is impossible for Japan to occupy an "honorable position" in the international society. To protect the country's independence and security which were handed down by the ancestors, and to transmit them perpetually to future generations is the responsibility of the government and the ruling party which control political power. I would like to ask the government to establish defense policies expeditiously. Since I am running out of space, I will touch on it only briefly.

First, among the various policies of a country, national security must be given top priority. This is because the independence and security of a country are the foundation of other policies of the nation and the economic and cultural activities of the people. This is common sense to the world.

Therefore, in the prime minister's administrative policy speech to inform the people of the government's policies, diplomatic and defense matters must be taken up first (regrettably, the defense issue was considered as an individual item only once by the Fukuda Cabinet of 1978). Together with the speeches on foreign policy, finances and economy, shouldn't there be a defense speech by the director general of the Defense Agency? As with the monthly economic ministers' conference, the National Defense Council' meetings should be held monthly for the purpose of briefing on the military situation, present status of the SDF, etc.

Secondly, national security policies must be comprehensive including military and nonmilitary items. Since security is defined as "to protect the safety of a country against external aggression" (Shin Horitsugaku Jiten [New Legal Dictionary] published by Yuhikaku, Kojien [Concise Cyclopedial], etc.), the policies must be centered on the military and diplomacy and especially in internal affairs, defense should be the focal point. The above policy must not be confused with the currently popular "overall security policy." (The so-called "overall security policy" only confuses security concepts and this writer has criticized it on another occasion--15 September issue of the weekly GENRON SHUNJU magazine--also, refer to pertinent criticisms by Seiichi Ishigaki in the 23 September issue of the weekly ECONOMIST.) The policies must be comprehensive but focused on the strengthening of defense capability, prevention and repelling of aggression and must not be merely a collection of administrative policies.

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Relatedly, a point which should be regarded most seriously is the people's will to defend their homeland. In the "Basic Policies for National Defense," adopted by the cabinet in 1957, one of the objectives is "To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the people's love for country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security." Measures to stabilize public welfare have been carried out and the standard of living now cannot be compared to then but as for enhancing the people's love of country, how much effort has been expended, e.g., in school education? Isn't the value of "protecting one's country" neglected in the courses on social studies, history, language, etc.? Previously, Education Minister Araki talked about revising the basic education law and Education Minister Nadao about the need for "national defense education," but the ideas have not materialized and the educational environment remains unchanged. As Justice Minister Okuno pointed out, the revision of education is the most urgent task.

Thirdly, as for defense capability, the level of troop strength specified in the "Outline" must be attained as soon as possible and both in name and reality, the buildup of defense power with true fighting ability must be clearly stated as the policy of topmost priority. To implement it, restrictions on defense spending must be abolished and a reappraisal of the "Medium Operation" be accomplished speedily. Legislation for emergencies must also be drafted immediately and the task should not be left to the Defense Agency alone but undertaken in earnest with the cabinet as the nucleus (Shuzo Hayashi pointed this out 2 years ago in the SANKEI newspaper).

Furthermore, as for the "Basic Policies for National Defense" on which the "Outline" is based, its philosophy and outlook of international situation cannot be maintained today (this writer has criticized it on another occasion--at a round-table discussion on security, "Security Considerations," 1 January 1979 issue) and should be revised. The troop strength might require some revisions but it is probably unnecessary to change it drastically for the time being. As for the defense capability described in the "Outline," it should be pointed out that the nuclear armament or concept of massive military buildup proposed by a segment (e.g., the ideas of the military science research group carried in Ikutaro Shimizu's "Japan, Become a Nation") are phantasies which are impossible to materialize and if arguments, giving false impressions that they would be realized soon, become rampant, they would thoughtlessly confuse discussions about defense. (Article dated 5 October 1980.)

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MILITARY

HAWKS, DOVES DISCUSS DEFENSE ISSUES

Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN in Japanese 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30 Sep 80  
and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Oct 80

[For serialized articles 1-6; Discussants: Hosai Hyuga, Mitsuo Tomizuka,  
Tokuma Utsunomiya and Osamu Kaihara]

[20 Sep 80, p 2]

[Text] (1) Defense Issues: Arguments and Rebuttals by Hosai Huyga (Chairman,  
Sumitomo Kinzoku, Ltd) and Mitsuo Tomizuka (Secretary General, General  
Council of Trade Unions of Japan)

The focus of attention today is on defense issues. There are active debates concerning the improvement of defense capability, the Soviet threat, constitutional amendment, military draft and many other issues. These debates will probably also take center stage at the upcoming extraordinary Diet session. The YOMIURI SHIMBUN has, therefore, taken this opportunity to gather experts from various circles, who are deeply concerned with "defense" relative to basic national security, for an in-depth discussion of the issues from their respective positions.

(Hyuga) When I suggested at the Kyoto seminar (his lecture at the 18th Kansai seminar for business leaders, 7 February) that a study should be conducted on the military draft system, it was taken up as an isolated issue and attracted some opposition. However, my feeling has always been that, if the people are to equally defend their country, the military draft is the fairest system. Nonetheless, it is obviously not feasible under the present Constitution and, since the Constitution cannot be amended, I intend to argue that the Self-Defense Forces, which defend the nation on behalf of all the people, be given greater respect. Also, the men of the SDF should be provided with adequate training and equipment for modern warfare. If the hypothetical enemy's tank divisions should invade Japan, it would not hold out for a week. Unable to defend even Hokkaido, morale would be low.

(Tomizuka) The defense debate began to heat up around 1977 and the issue rapidly caught the attention of the Fukuda Cabinet. And there was a statement by you, Mr Hyuga. Also, amid the overwhelming victory by the Liberal Democratic Party in the recent "double elections," there was a series of statements on the revision of the Constitution, as well as talk of a separate framework of defense spending, and the defense debate seemed to move very rapidly to the forefront.

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However, I believe we are about to turn from the cold war posture of East-West confrontation to a multipolar situation. Under such conditions, the peoples of the world are giving serious thought to full detente, but the concept of East-West confrontation is still at the root of the Hyuga statement.

(Hyuga) Military spending in Switzerland, which is permanently neutral, is 1.9 percent of its GNP. I think that, if Japan's present defense spending of 0.9 percent is increased by 1 percent, it should be adequate. Also, it can be paid with half of the natural revenue increase in the FY-80 budget. If the lives, property and welfare of the people--and the nation, which constitutes the basis for all these facets--could be defended with this money, I believe it would be well spent.

(Tomizuka) The next issue I wish to point out is the question of how Japan's national interests are being viewed. I wonder if the emphasis is not being placed on business interests and an attempt is not being made to shift the issue to economic growth through arms production. I wonder if we should not watch the key changing trends of the world, carefully observe the situation at home and abroad, and then take measured steps.

(Hyuga) Regarding the question of why the SDF should be strengthened, all nations are spending three or four times as much as Japan for defense. Although our nation is under the U.S.-Japan security pact, it is equipping the SDF at the rate of 0.9 percent. Will this be adequate. I do not think so.

Also, the increase in defense strength is alleged to be for the benefit of industry, but, despite the modernization and buildup of the present Self-Defense Forces, Japan's annual arms production equals only 0.38 percent of total industrial production. Even if the Self-Defense Forces were to be doubled, defense production would equal only about 0.2 percent of steel production.

(Tomizuka) Although the Self-Defense Forces have been considered as a violation of Article 9 of the Constitution, its formation is an established fact. What shall the future direction of the Self-Defense Forces be? The trend seems to be moving according to America's wishes toward improvement of the Self-Defense Forces' capability. I am opposed to its expansion.

(Hyuga) You say that you are opposed to the buildup of the Self-Defense Forces, but it is not wise to leave the Self-Defense Forces with useless equipment, unable to function as a modern military force. In view of Japan's long coastline, some buildup of the Maritime Self-Defense Force is necessary. It would probably suffice if the defense fleet was doubled from the present 190,000 tons to 400,000 tons.

(Tomizuka) As usual, your argument is based on the hypothesis of the Soviet Union as the enemy, at a time when the multilateral and multipolar evolution of detente is an issue. It appears in the form of "emergency" legislation, the Pan-Pacific solidarity concept and the buildup of the Self-Defense Forces, based on the hypothesis of a potential enemy in accordance with U.S. strategy.

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(Hyuga) There is no hypothetical enemy. However, a military force exists before our eyes. We must maintain a balance with it. Basically, we should avoid wars, including nuclear ones. Without local deterrent power, we would be susceptible to intrusions which would invite a large-scale war.

(Tomizuka) If the increase in next year's defense spending could be raised by 15.4 percent, the defense-related budget for FY-83 would be about 3,500 billion yen. Defense industry productivity would exceed 1,000 billion yen. It seems that the business community has its eyes set on the nation's financial measures. Under conditions where the steel, automobile and heavy chemical industries are unable to advance satisfactorily into overseas markets, there appears to be undercurrent efforts to link them to the revival of the arms industry.

(Hyuga) The ratio to GNP in West Germany is 3.4 percent; in France it is 3.3 percent; in Britain, 4.7 percent, and, even in Switzerland, it is 1.9 percent. They are keeping the wolves from the door with the people sharing the burden. There is no need for them to become military powers.

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[Text] (Tomizuka) Do the Self-Defense Forces belong to the people or the state? Civilian control sounds good, literally speaking. But when one considers its feasibility from a practical viewpoint, with Japan's political power it does not seem very plausible. If the trend is toward revival of the arms industry desired by the capitalists, civilian control would be left out nilly-willy, making it impossible to adopt a form in favor of the people. That would be a dangerous situation. Such talk is most popular during elections. There is no guarantee that the Self-Defense Forces would not occupy the newspapers and broadcasting stations, and stage a coup d'etat.

Japan should closely embrace the spirit of the Peace Constitution, whereby it renounced wars, and it should uphold the concept of unarmed neutrality.

(Hyuga) There is no nation in the world which upholds unarmed neutrality. There is no example of it being respected. Even permanently neutral Switzerland is armed to some extent. Japan exists in the shadow of U.S.-Soviet detente by virtue of the U.S.-Japan security pact. In order to effectively utilize the security pact, Japan is asked by the United States to increase its defense strength, and I say we should try harder. There is no telling where the enemy will come from. Japan is surrounded on four sides by the seas, and defensive effort is necessary also to deter wars.

(Tomizuka) There are many reasons to believe that, as long as Japan remains under the U.S.-Japan security pact umbrella, the Soviet Union and the Eastern European nations would be suspicious of Japan. Isn't that why intrusions into our territorial air and seas sometimes occur? I believe it is proper for the government to settle the problem politically through diplomacy. Diplomacy based on a cold-war structure of East-West confrontation will not do. I believe the Soviet Union is suspicious that Japan is attempting to increase its strength at America's behest.

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(Hyuga) For any nation, the basis for the people's lives, property and welfare lies in the nation's security. Therefore, every nation exerts maximum effort toward its defense. From the standpoint of finances, it would mean halting the construction of roads. So our solution would be to postpone construction for a little while, or to divert half of the natural revenue increase in the FY-80 budget to defense.

(Tomizuka) That is too much to ask at a time when the rebuilding of finances is a pivotal issue. The natural revenue increase is at most 4,000 billion yen, whereas the year end national bond issue balance is as much as 71,000 billion yen. The finance minister is intent on decreasing the ordinary deficit bond issues by 2,000 billion yen at a step for the time being. However, the debts from the high growth era are now catching up with us in the form of financial difficulties. There are various problems concerning national living conditions, such as underpopulated areas, overpopulated areas, public nuisances, etc., and we must now reexamine the quality of our living.

The Finance Ministry talks about reexamining medical costs for the elderly and free distribution of school textbooks, as well as abolishing special allowances for children. With the technological reforms of the high growth era, the types of workers have changed and wages have risen. Although the livelihood of the people has improved through the purchase of durable goods, all the distortions of the era have remained to cause difficulties in the nation's financial status. At a time when the adjustment of inequitable taxes, the review of revenues and expenditures, and administrative reforms are required to reduce spending, the people would not stand for an increase in defense expenditures. What I am concerned about is that, if we adjust to Switzerland's standard, there is no guarantee that we will not be asked next to consider acquiring nuclear power like the United States and the Soviet Union, or China.

(Hyuga) Japan cannot defend itself independently. And, this, in the nuclear age. In that sense, Japan has no alternative except to exist under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S.-Japan security pact.

However, although we do have the security pact, it is quite egoistic to depend on it while spending an unheard-of 0.9 percent of the GNP, or a mere one-third or one-fourth of the world's average defense cost per person. And it would be difficult for the American politicians to understand it. Conversely, Japan is concentrating its efforts on its industries and aggressively selling goods to America. It is only natural for Americans to think that "Japan's attitude is outrageous."

(Tomizuka) I cannot agree with the argument that "Japan is locking its doors," without discussing Japan's appropriate defense strength in terms of its deterrent power. In the final analysis, it could lead to a dangerous argument for strengthening the military bloc through subordination to the United States. Also, might not there be the thinking in the background of promoting the arms industry? I see this as rhetoric by the "merchants of death." The fact that defense spending is treated in a separate framework

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seems rather suspicious. At root is the question of how the national consensus should be formulated on the defense issue...how the wrestling arena should be formed.

(Hyuga) The United States spends in excess of 5 percent of its GNP (for defense), including its shares of burden pertaining to Japan and NATO. The NATO member nations allocate more than 3 percent of their respective GNP and offer favorable treatment to the American forces stationed there. NATO pays adequately for costs incurred, but Japan takes a free ride at U.S. expense without paying a fair share of the cost. My argument is that, although it may result in financial difficulty, we should at least match Switzerland as an immediate goal. I believe that, in doing so, the buildup of purely defensive power will be possible.

[22 Sep 80, p 2]

[Text] (Tomizuka) A recent U.S. public opinion poll shows that 63 percent feel "Japan should increase its military forces," which surpasses the previous poll (1978) by 9 percent. It seems that the United States intends to direct its attention toward China and Europe by letting Japan assume a considerably larger share of its own defense.

The Democratic People's Republic (North Korea) versus South Korea; Vietnam versus Kampuchea; China and Japan...while the political confrontations among these Asian nations become intertwined with economic competition, the United States would probably turn its attention in the direction of China and Europe. And it would be an inevitable move. As for Japan-U.S. relations, we have seen economic friction over automobiles, steel and electrical machinery surfacing in connection with the defense issue. It thus appears that the nature of the U.S.-Japan security pact is heading for a change.

In one respect, the United States demands that Japan bolster its defense capability. But we must be prepared at the same time for considerable demands regarding economic problems. With this as a backdrop, I believe the time has come for efforts on our part to deliberate how to rescind the security treaty through discussions. You are concerned about a Soviet invasion and air intrusions, but we do have the forums of the United Nations and diplomacy.

(Hyuga) As long as Japan is a free and liberal nation, it is essential to maintain a mutual security pact with our most important ally, the United States. It is good for the United States and China to become friendly. It would also serve as a rein on the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, it would be overly selfish for a free Japan to use the U.S.-Japan security pact merely for its own national interests.

(Tomizuka) Once, when Chairman Asanuma of the Japan Socialist Party visited China, he said, "U.S. imperialism is the common enemy of Japan and China." However, when the then Premier Deng Xiaoping came to Japan, he expressed an affirmative opinion regarding the U.S.-Japan security pact and said that he supported defense power for Japan. We were completely taken by surprise.

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China is promoting modernization and the transition of power to the next generation. One could say they are reviewing their present diplomatic and defense strategies from the standpoint of national interests, but one can never tell when they might come to an honorable compromise with the Soviet Union. Or, Vietnam allies itself with the Soviet Union, and amid the confrontation with Kampuchea, one side (Kampuchea) allies itself with China. Again, one hears that China has recently been looking covetously toward Europe. In this era of such drastically changing international situations, we would be heading for a great fall if we continue to adhere inflexibly toward the buildup of our defense to the satisfaction of the United States, under the umbrella of the joint security pact and in order to remove economic frictions.

(Hyuga) Yet, according to a certain public opinion poll, as much as 86 percent of the people support the Self-Defense Forces. The people are overwhelmingly in support of the status quo. And, America, our ally, says we should try a little harder. Therefore, it behooves Japan to be friendly with the nations of the world, while maintaining the status quo. That is, including China and the Soviet Union. If both sides retain a localized (regional) balance, peace negotiations would be possible. If one side alone has power, the other side can only ask for mercy.

(Tomizuka) I can understand what you are saying, for what it is worth. I do not think the young people today would agree readily that a 1.9-percent share of the defense costs in relation to the GNP--on the same level with Switzerland--or a compulsory military draft, should be considered in order to defend our national interests.

(Hyuga) It is the free bloc countries which are making an effort to defend themselves. It is the Soviet Union which has a major national policy, whereby it urges other peoples to cooperate with it, in order to change the world from capitalism to communism. It has military bases near us which pose a threat. We need adequate arms to meet that threat. I believe this is what constitutes "national defense."

(Tomizuka) Peaceful diplomacy must be pursued on the basis of national consensus--not bilaterally, but with all the nations of the world. Simultaneously, the posture of national defense must be established positively, while strengthening the role of the United Nations.

(Hyuga) Of course, diplomatic efforts should be exerted, with defense strength as the basis.

(Tomizuka) I think there is a common consciousness, as far as loving one's country is concerned. The problem is to think of not only defense strength because we love our country, but also to think of the total and comprehensive living of the people. That includes national finances, our personal lives, the social environment, etc.

(Hyuga) The question is whether there will be the danger of Japan being drawn into a war in the 1980s. If we build adequate defense strength and

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maintain the U.S.-Japan security pact, and if we seek harmony with every nation on the diplomatic front, we can maintain security.

(Tomizuka) There have been numerous problems, such as the U.S.-Iran confrontation, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the crisis in Poland. But, in the 1980s, the peoples of the world would probably be sustained by sensibility, and there would be no war.

(Hyuga) I do not think there will be a major war, but invasions could occur in places like Afghanistan and Kampuchea where arms deployment is thin. As long as there are nations whose basic policy is conversion to socialism, such incidents are possible.

[23 Sep 80, p 2]

[Text] Defense Issues: Argument and Rebuttal by Tokuma Utsunomiya (member, Diet Upper House) and Osamu Kaihara (military affairs expert)

The origin of the recent defense debate is generally traceable to the United States. The Arab problem harbors the greatest danger for America. The Arab voice has become stronger with energy as their leverage, while the control power of the major oil companies has declined. Nor has the Israeli problem shown any progress. The Iranian problem has also come up. There is the danger that the Soviet Union might advance into the Middle East. Also, there are economic problems, of which increased exports of cars by Japan to America is a salient one. There is a feeling that "Japan exerts little effort to arm itself, while producing cheap goods for export, so let us apply a little pressure." About this time, the Soviet Union invades Afghanistan, and the demand arises for Japan to increase its military spending in order to carry out its international responsibility.

(Kaihara) There is also the "1983 crisis" theory. It is rumored in Europe and America that, between 1983 and 1985, the Soviet Union will resort to military action at the risk of nuclear war. It is, therefore, necessary also to prepare against events in the dangerous Middle East.

In that case, what will become of the Pacific region? Japan feels relaxed in the Pacific region, although Japan and Europe will suffer most if the USSR controls the Persian Gulf. However, Japan's attitude toward such an eventuality is based on the belief that building planes, warships and tanks at a feverish pace is equivalent to strengthening its military power. This is dangerous.

(Utsunomiya) As far as the American Congress is concerned, would it not be satisfied as long as Japan pays its share of defense costs? Veteran U.S. politicians like Fulbright (former senator) were men of international vision. The politicians today lack foresight.

When considering Japan's defense, there is no unified land, sea and air strategy. The U.S.-Japan security pact states, "When the United Nations, which is assigned the role of adequately stabilizing international peace and security, loses effectiveness of its operations," the efficacy of the treaty will cease.

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Also, in the "fundamental policy for national defense," it says, "In the future, until the United Nations performs its function of effectively deterring invasions, the U.S.-Japan security pact shall serve as the underpinning." However, the Japanese Government has hardly ever made any effort toward strengthening the peace-keeping function of the United Nations.

(Kaiharu) European politicians stated 15 years ago, as follows: "The United Nations is politically incompetent. It is financially bankrupt. Nonetheless, it serves as a significant forum for debate." Actually, it is a far cry from the ideals which existed when the United Nations charter came into being. The United Nations is powerless to suppress disputes.

(Utsunomiya) Spending money on wars and defense ends in suffering on the part of the people. If such efforts were directed toward the United Nations, the peace-keeping function of the United Nations could be strengthened.

(Kaiharu) Aside from your evaluation, there is no doubt that such efforts are necessary. The government is doing nothing but trying to catch up with reality.

(Utsunomiya) It is necessary to consider the rapid advance of the destructive power of weapons and their capability to inflict death and injury. Regardless of victory or defeat, wars inflict tremendous damage on the people. Today, the world is faced with public nuisances and lack of natural resources. It is not the time to be obsessed with military expansion.

(Kaiharu) First, there is the question of what constitutes military power. People talk as if only tanks, planes and warships constitute military power. This is strange. I think that tanks, attack fighter planes and defense ships are merely launching pads for missiles and cannonballs. Although launching pads may exist, they are of no use without ammunition and men to launch them.

Unlike battles of the past, future battles will be premised on an invasion by some country. No one has taken up the problem of what the people should do in such an event. I believe that strengthening military power means to completely utilize the arms presently held. In order to counter invading tanks from a foreign nation, antitank missiles are much more effective. The land, sea and air weapons of the Self-Defense Forces are not integrated. The greatest factor is the belief of the Maritime Self-Defense Force that the security of the sea lanes, or maritime transportation, is vital. I say this is nonsense.

(Utsunomiya) The United States also tends to overemphasize the factor.

(Kaiharu) Japan has for a long time stressed the blockade of the three straits (surrounding Japan) and the security of maritime transportation. It has come back to haunt us.

(Utsunomiya) There is also the problem of Arab oil.

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(Kaihara) Yes. However, regarding oil, the United States says it cannot guarantee the safety of the sea lanes. There is no reason why it can.

(Utsunomiya) If the sea lanes cannot be secured, the people's livelihood will be immediately paralyzed in the event of involvement in a war, even in terms of fuel and food provisions.

(Kaihara) Many years ago, I was a machine gunner in the Imperial Army. Whether or not a single machine gun is an effective unit of fighting power depends on many conditions: whether the number of gunners is singular or plural, how long the ammunition supply will last, whether the machine gun is exposed in an open field or placed inside a bunker, etc. The number of machine guns alone does not mean much. The worst predicament is to wish for a deluxe American model.

(Utsunomiya) That is a very good point. If the bullets do not hit the target, the hardware means nothing. There is another reason why the United States wants Japan to rearm. That is, American weapons are rapidly becoming outdated in the arms race. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are anxious to sell off their antiquated weapons.

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[Text] (Utsunomiya) Politicians should be more astute concerning the defense problem. Assuming that we get into a war, it cannot be conducted without an effective background of diplomacy. And, if we are to avoid a war, it is impossible without a truly functioning diplomacy. In any deliberation on defense, a close debate is necessary, based on knowledge of the adversary and perception concerning the international situation.

(Kaihara) A bonafide defense debate in the Diet is desired. One barrier, however, is the Japan Socialist Party. It embraces the strange policy of unarmed neutrality. Yet, when the "Three Arrows" subcommittee was formed during the "Three Arrows incident," it submitted a report on its review to the budget committee. At the time, the Japan Socialist Party's Masashi Ishibashi said, "The Japan Socialist Party does not recognize the Self-Defense Forces. We have specifically rejected all debates on the Self-Defense Forces from this standpoint, but it is wrong."

He also stated, "It is an undeniable fact that an armed force of more than 200,000 troops does exist. The Japan Socialist Party also has the responsibility as a public political party for the proper control and management of this force." And, he added, "In this regard, a committee should be formed in the Diet. The Liberal Democratic Party would call it a standing committee, but we should consider our own position, meet them halfway, and propose the establishment of a special committee." I was truly impressed.

(Utsunomiya) Instead of noisily debating defense, the politicians should seriously consider the control and management of the Self-Defense Forces. Taking the current Iran-Iraq war as an example, every nation should cooperate

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with the sensible leaders of other nations in reviewing the problem of global disarmament. This is the way to avoid worldwide destruction.

(Kaihara) Prevention of war is a political and diplomatic responsibility.

(Utsunomiya) I received a letter from (Senator) Fulbright in July of last year, in which he writes, "I believe that Japan, which renounced military power and is dedicated to cultural progress, is contributing more than any other nation to the promotion of the cause of peace. I hope that you and your colleagues will continue to embrace this policy and refuse all attempts by Americans and others to pressure Japan into seeking rearmament." Also, Muskie (previous chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and present Secretary of State) wrote to me in October, 2 years ago, saying, "I have always hoped that the leaders of Japan would assume the role of adding authority and justifiability to those who would delay the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers, and eventually reverse the trend." Such serious efforts toward peace are necessary.

(Kaihara) Speaking of defending one's country, what is to be defended, and from what? Incidentally, the "Guidelines for Defense" decided by the Cabinet in October 1976 is merely a treatise. It says, "The Self-Defense Forces shall counter any limited and small-scale invasion." It does not at all explain what is meant by "limited and small-scale," or how large a force might invade us, and under what conditions. It means we shall counter whatever adversary we can within our power. Also, if a stronger force should intrude, we would ask America's help as well as the backing of world opinion, and, meanwhile, strongly resist with all our means. However, we have no capability to "strongly resist." The "Guidelines for Defense" gives the impression that we might be able to offer tremendous resistance, but in reality we can do little. This is similar to the erstwhile invincible Imperial Armed Forces. The nation deserves a more specific explanation.

(Utsunomiya) A quick defeat is certain in any war without considering energy and food supplies. Even if it does not develop into a war, an economic blockade alone would put the Japanese nation under starvation conditions, factories would grind to a halt and the outcome would be fatal. Therefore, efforts toward peace are essential, whereby chances of invasion into Japan and the danger of wars in surrounding areas would be removed.

(Kaihara) The guarantee of national security means an overall effort on the diplomatic, economic and military fronts. It is basically a comprehensive concept. As in the case of the group report submitted to Prime Minister Suzuki, the objective is sometimes blurred when the term 'comprehensive' is used. When reference is made to security in foreign countries, it is limited to military threats. Therefore, a contradiction between security in an international sense may result. We must be aware of this danger.

(Utsunomiya) It will not do to talk of increasing the stockpile of weapons and of purchasing them. Unless we increase what has to be increased, or decrease what has to be decreased, after an adequate security plan has been formulated, it would be a waste of national funds. The cumulative total defense spending thus far amounts to some 17,000 billion yen. It would be ridiculous if all of that were "spent in vain."

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(Kaiharu) Since the defense budget often entails expenditures which are continued over a span of several years, once an item is included, it tends to expand rapidly from the following fiscal year. The estimate budget request reveals a plethora of new items. Some are not even included in the mid-term operations plan. They are loaded into a 40-50 billion yen budget estimate, revealing only a tip of the costs, and are destined to grow into much greater figures. This practice must be stopped. It is odd that haphazard discussions are conducted solely between the Finance Ministry's accounting bureau and the Defense Agency and, before you know it, they are saying, "Well, this was an expected increase, so it should be approved."

[27 Sep 80, p 2]

[Text] (Utsunomiya) Although the Soviet threat is frequently bruited about, the present Soviet diplomatic environment is in too sorry a state for the Soviets to wage a large-scale operation against Japan--in Hokkaido or elsewhere. As you know, China and the Soviet Union are confronting each other with 50 divisions deployed respectively along the 5,000-kilometer China-Soviet border. I wonder whether the Soviets can invade Japan under these conditions. Our northern territories, Kunashiri and Habomai, are too small to function as military bases. If their troops were to be concentrated there, the Soviets would be subjected to damages worth about 30 billion yen from a single U.S. bomber worth about 100 million yen. The increase in the Soviet Far Eastern Army is probably based on vigilance toward China.

Therefore, we should not intentionally conclude that a threat toward Japan exists. It would be different if China and the Soviet Union constituted a military monolith, but the China-Soviet confrontation would not dissolve so easily. The Soviets do not control the Japan Sea or the air over Japan, so it cannot easily invade Japan.

(Kaiharu) I am thinking of the Soviet threat, apart from the deployment of the Minsk (helicopter carrier) and the Backfire (long-range bomber). When a Japan-Soviet symposium was held in the Soviet city of Tashkent, 2 years ago, on "Detente in Asia," I made two contentions from the standpoint of policy and action.

First, the fact that the Soviet Union is declaring to the world, that wars for the liberation of peoples are wars of justice, and is implementing them. The wars in Vietnam and Angola were such wars. However, as long as the idea that wars for the liberation of peoples are wars of justice does not die out, wars will not cease. If the Soviet Union truly thinks about detente, it should practice the principle of self-determination for the peoples--a principle which exists in the world community.

Secondly, the Soviet Union has deployed vast land, sea and air forces in Asia. The army has 31 divisions; the navy, 1,380,000 tons, and the air force, 2,040 planes. If it does not intend to use military power in the future, there would be no need to deploy these troops in Asia. There is no nation in Asia which would invade the Soviet Union. Japan's Self-Defense Forces

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are garrisons which guard its four islands. It is impossible to think that China's 3.5 million troops would cross the China-Soviet border to occupy the coastal provinces.

Therefore, the Soviet armed forces should reduce its border garrisons. The possession of vast armies by powerful nations itself poses a threat to their neighboring countries.

(Utsunomiya) By liberation of the peoples is meant the liberation of peoples under colonial rule. Even after the revolution, the Soviet Union has continued to control the vast lands of central Asia, which were colonized during the Czarist era. China is more positive regarding the question of the liberation of peoples. China says it "will not export revolution," but the question is whether the Soviet Union envisions world domination. The attitude of the USSR toward the problem of autonomous administration in Poland and the progress of the full-scale Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, a non-satellite country, bears careful watching.

(Kaihara) I agree heartily. From the standpoint of the Soviet policy of liberating the peoples, rather than a Soviet invasion of Japan, the spread of communist influence through indirect invasion in Africa, the Middle East, Central America and South America, comes to mind. In such cases, I do not think the theory of a crisis between 1983 and 1985 is realistic. The reason is, there are no winners or losers in a nuclear war.

However, unless the Soviet Union alters its thinking and when such conditions ripen in the future, the theoretical potential for the beginning of wars of liberation of peoples in order to spread what they call communism cannot be denied. How to cope with them is a broad political problem, and the countermeasures could include the issue of defense power.

(Utsunomiya) The point in considering the defense issue is, "What do we defend?" The lives and property of the people, and the structure or system which sustains them, must be comprehensively protected. At the core of the system is sovereignty, but in recent wars the casualty among noncombatants has been excessive. What is sovereignty if the majority of the people suffer death and injury? Politicians must be extremely cautious regarding wars. Increased armament not only applies pressure on the economic life of the people, it also invites wars. In such times as these, Japan should meet the trend toward armament by pointing to its peace constitution and persuading the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their armament. In order to do so, the peace-keeping structure of the United Nations should be enlarged both qualitatively and quantitatively. In comparison to military costs, the money spent for it would be minimal. Japan should persuade the United States, China and the Soviet Union on this point.

(Kaihara) For one thing, there should be a clear distinction between ideals and reality. Ideals should absolutely be pursued, but without reality there can only be fantasy. What I mean is, we should not be fantasizing concerning matters of the state and nation. Politics deal with realities. We should be aware of what our neighboring countries are thinking and act accordingly.

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Secondly, regarding what we must defend, I think we should protect the free and liberal system of Japan. It is another thing if the people prefer a communist Japan. Their preference is a problem of values. In order to protect a free Japan, what will the people do from the standpoint of defense if they should be invaded by a foreign foe? This point has not at all been debated in the political forums. Such a debate should be the point of departure. 5854

[Serialized articles 7-15; Article 8 not included]

[28 Sep 80, p 2]

[Discussants: Masatsugu Ishibashi, Dietman, Japan Socialist Party/Hiroomi Kurisu, former Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff]

[Text] Do Not Use Outside Pressure--Ishibashi

Wider Interpretation of the Constitution--Kurisu

Ishibashi: The problem that worries and concerns me the most right now is making defense spending subject to special handling in the compilation of the budget for the next fiscal year. When former Prime Minister Ohira visited America last May he promised President Carter "conspicuous, steady increase in defense capability." Defense spending was made subject to special handling on the assumption that if that promise is not kept, it will violate international trust. The United States has persistently repeated statements throwing doubt on Japan's efforts to build up its defense. Just whose army is the Self-Defense Force?

Kurisu: It is a positive development for defense or total security to be actively debated. However, it gives the people the impression that there has been a change in policy if we take the course of suddenly increasing defense expenditures because of discussions with America at the same time that we say that economic rebuilding is necessary.

Ishibashi: A further problem is the fact that "interim operation estimate" was passed on to the United States. The interim estimate is internal information for the Defense Agency and is not acknowledged on a government-wide basis. Once this was taken to America, the president told us to implement it one year ahead of time. We never had this kind of undisguised intervention by the United States before.

Kurisu: The expansion of defense capability being discussed right now is limited to physical aspects. In order to utilize the Self-Defense Force most effectively, it is necessary to improve morale, not just the budget and equipment. We must make it clear that the Self-Defense Force exists for the nation and its people.

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If the Self-Defense Force is used, not just as the nation's "watch dog," but as part of the "government staff" which can give its opinion for reference in policy decisions by top officials, there will be an upsurge in morale. By just changing the thinking of the government and the LDP toward the Self-Defense Forces in this way, I believe that they can be effective with the present personnel and equipment.

Furthermore, the content of the 0.9 percent of the GNP is not being discussed at all. The dissatisfaction of the military is not related to the fact that the present defense expenditures will not increase. Rather, it is due to shortcomings in the nature of those expenditures and the lack of awareness of the situation.

Ishibashi: No, the problem is the use of outside pressure from America to go beyond the framework of Japanese defense and the attempt to expand military power for the peace and security of the Far East. Is this not totally ignoring the peace constitution?

Kurisu: But, when we think about overall security, including energy, the Middle East situation is a problem of life and death for Japan. In recent developments, when the Middle East situation became very tense and the Afghanistan problem also occurred, the Seventh Fleet had to be moved from the Far East to the Middle East. What America is really saying is, "A hole has opened up in the Far East. Japan, do something!" Why can't we voluntarily say, "Japan cannot survive without oil so it is unavoidable for the American forces to go to the Middle East and control the situation. Do not worry about what happens here. Japan will try to handle it one way or another."

Ishibashi: With that, there will be more and more military expansion. Previously, in the Diet, Mr Sanada, the Director General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau at that time, made this controversial statement. "The boundaries of our country's right to self-defense are bound to change depending on the time, the overall situation at a given time, the state of advancement of military science, the environment, etc." This would trample underfoot the covenant of Article 5 of the Constitution.

America aims at converting the Mutual Security Pact into its true form as a military alliance. If the Mutual Security Pact becomes a bilateral treaty, a problem of collective self-defense rights will occur. The government says that under the present Constitution, collective self-defense rights are not recognized. This is because of a constitutional provision, but meanwhile, a fait accompli is being steadily brought about under the "Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines" and RimPAC (joint Pacific rim training) etc.

Kurisu: Just the same, Japan cannot survive in isolation. That was where we failed in the last war. If in our thinking we take the preamble to the Constitution as a basic premise where it states that we will exist as a peaceful nation, a nation that is respected by the world, we must not isolate ourselves from the rest of the world. If that is so, we can only have a wider interpretation. This is the wisdom necessary for survival.

Ishibashi: If we ignore or make an empty shell of the Constitution, taking the sort of approach that the Constitution depends on the existence of the nation, how can we achieve a national consensus. This is much worse than the arguments for revising the Constitution. Security cannot be achieved in isolation. It is not for this reason that we chose, with the peace Constitution, to achieve security by creating friendly relations with close neighboring countries in particular and achieving relations under which there is, at the least, no fear or concern over attacking or being attacked.

Kurusu: Certainly, one way to achieve a national consensus is to think within the framework of the Constitution. However, awareness of the international situation is also basic to a national consensus. The arguments over the Constitution have been exhausted. What is lacking is situational judgment and not enough information has been provided for judgment.

[30 Sep 80, p 4]

[Discussants: Masatsugu Ishibashi, Dietman, Japan Socialist/Hiroomi Kurisu, former Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff]

[Text] Conditions for Dissolution of Self-Defense Force--Ishibashi

Awareness of Reality by People--Kurusu

Ishibashi: Our position on demilitarization and neutrality is not accurately understood in some particulars. We are criticized on the prejudiced assumption that if the Socialist Party took power, we would do away with the Self-Defense Force and the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Pact tomorrow. The Self-Defense Force is unconstitutional, but we will not get anywhere by saying "we do not recognize" something that actually exists. Even if the Socialist Party took power, it would be impossible not to inherit the Self-Defense Force and the Security Pact. What is important is the process of reforming and moving toward the achievement of our goals and the goals of the Constitution. This is the "Ishibashi plan" announced 14 years ago and is the position of the Socialist Party. Even if we reduce the Self-Defense Force, I do not believe that things can be settled without considering at least four conditions. These are: (1) ceasing to look at the Soviet Union as an enemy and making efforts to restore normal relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) to create an international environment in which the nation can feel secure, (2) changing the training of the Self-Defense Forces so that it is more peaceful and democratic and creating conditions under which it can cooperate with the Socialist Party, (3) creating a stable government, and (4) obtaining support and acceptance from the people. People attack demilitarized neutrality as nonsense without understanding these four basic principles for disbanding the Self-Defense Forces, but it is not unrealistic at all. If the people do not accept this with reality staring them in the face, there is nothing to be done. However, understanding is growing. The view also exists that there is nothing wrong with the present level of armament. The only reason it stays at the present level is because of the constitution and the forces defending the Constitution.

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Kurisu: I think it is fine for a political party to have objectives. However, it is strange to set a far off goal, draw from it a straight line to the present situation, and not deviate one step from it. It is a good thing to have flexibility enough for either expansion or retraction to take place.

Ishibashi: The "Kurisu statement" concerning emergency legislation was controversial, and civilian control of the Self-Defense Forces is not clearly defined. The problem is whether there are politicians who can control them. And whether the legislature can....

Kurisu: If the person who has the decision-making authority for their control does not know the true state of affairs he cannot handle them. The attempt to control them without such knowledge is going unchallenged.

Ishibashi: In the "Ishibashi plan" also this is greatly stressed. The Diet has responsibility for control. I proposed forming a special committee to inspect the state of the Self-Defense Forces. In order to have control, it is necessary to inspect the troops and debate sufficiently to get a grasp of the actual situation. It is doubtful whether the present special security committee can function to exert sufficient control.

Kurisu: It is my hope that the military will also study sufficiently. The Diet should call in the military and have them speak, but the mood there seems to be against this.

Ishibashi: Just because the civilian authorities do not have the ability, it is no solution to have the military appear in the Diet. Priority should be given to strengthening the civilian side. My fear is that if the appearance of the military is allowed, it will lead to the entrance of the military into civilian affairs.

Kurisu: The civilian authorities do not understand the viewpoint of the military. That is simply because they do not go out to the troops. The only thing the civilian officials are concerned with is dealing with the Diet. For example, budget, equipment development, supply--these things can be handled well by civilians. However, such things as drilling and strategic planning cannot be understood without working together with the people involved 365 days a year.

Ishibashi: As long as the present problem with the Constitution exists, I would like to avoid having the military appear in the Diet. There are things that the military cannot help but be offended by. If the military make a radical statement and the opposition parties demand that it be dismissed, I am afraid it would lead to undesirable consequences. For me, caution comes first.

Kurisu: On that point, I think it is fine to make sparks fly and call for dismissal as much as you want. In that way, the people will be convinced one way or the other. If they think the opposition parties' statements are inappropriate, that is all right.

Ishibashi: However, I think of the Constitution problem and the military problem separately. As far as the military problem is concerned, that would be only natural. But because the Constitution exists, the government and the bureaucracy make illogical statements and twist them around. I think that is the problem.

Kurisu: I am aware of that.

Ishibashi: That is what I think but, just because of that, I do not want to hear the military problem discussed in the Diet without taking the Constitution into account.

Kurisu: Can't that sort of thing be done in a secret meeting?

Ishibashi: I do not think it is impossible.

Kurisu: Then it would be possible to ignore it if a radical statement were made. I think the important thing in the discussion of defense is for not only the politicians, but the people as well, to understand the realities inside and outside the nation.

Ishibashi: I do not think it is possible to maintain true security or defense without a national consensus or at least the agreement of the larger part of the people. In what way can we find this common ground? In a democratic country it must be in the Constitution. I would like you to be aware that unless the argument is based on the premise of following the Constitution, there is no possibility of obtaining national consensus or of finding the way to effective security.

Kurisu: I would like to add to that awareness of reality.

[1 Oct 80, p 2]

[Discussants: Masamichi Inoki, former president of Defense College/  
Kimihiro Masamura, professor, Senshu University]

[Text] Maintenance More Important Than Expansion--Inoki

Consider Allocation Compared With Welfare--Masamura

Inoki: Beginning with "Soviet Army Lands in Japan," books on the Soviet threat are coming out at the rate of one a week. Absurd arguments are heard everywhere, to the extent that one wonders if it is not part of a KGB plot. It would certainly be convenient for the Soviet Union if Japan gave in without fighting, but I cannot agree with this idea [of an invincible Soviet threat]. It is unhealthy for the security debate to be started by this sort of provocation.

Masamura: I agree. The previous theory that the Soviet Union was a force for peace will not do but it is also dangerous to recklessly blow up the Soviet threat. In the Soviet Union as well, there is a historical background and line of development for foreign policy and defense. Post-revolutionary Soviet

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history includes the experience of being attacked by other countries and having Soviet people killed. In other words, there are conditions which necessitate their maintaining a firm defensive balance.

Inoki: While recognizing the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, it is important to work to have the legitimate interests of Japan recognized by the Soviets as well. I often say, "Think as if you were a Soviet political leader." If you do, you will realize that the only country you do not have to worry about around the perimeter of the Soviet Union is Mongolia. Even Poland is dangerous. Looking at it this way, the Soviet Union is actually a "cowardly bear." Of course, if it once eats a man, there is no way of knowing how wild it can become.

Masamura: Of course, there is a problem in the Soviet Union becoming excessively defensive. However, they have their reasons, and we must consider their situation rationally as we continue discussing defense.

Inoki: Reconciliation of Japan and the Soviet Union, or diplomatic effort, is important. The Soviet Union says the problem of the northern territories is already settled. Japan takes the view that unless the problem of northern territories is solved, there is no possibility of substantial improvement in Japanese-Soviet relations. The Soviets should at least recognize that a concern exists over the northern territories. Along with this, if the Soviet Union would reduce the military strength now expanding in the northern territories, Japanese-Soviet relations would improve. If we take the premise that the northern territories problem remains unsolved, there is plenty of possibility for discussion. Now that Japanese-Soviet relations have worsened, if we recklessly increase defense capability unilaterally like some fanatical armament expansionists suggest, the Soviet Union will seriously misunderstand us. This cannot help but lead to trouble. Just the same, the Soviet Union is excessively paranoid about its own defense to the extent of threatening other countries and making a lot of enemies. The Soviet Union is hated by all the countries around it because it puts so much effort into military strength. Even though the Soviet Union itself thinks it is doing this for security, when it seeks 200 percent or 300 percent security, neighboring countries feel threatened.

Masamura: The security problem must be considered comprehensively at all levels and in all its aspects. Considering defense in the limited case of a nuclear war occurring and the entire earth being polluted with radiation, there would be no meaning in the amount of arms possessed. If the Soviet Union were to attack Japan in earnest, no amount of military preparedness would suffice. There is no level of armament at which we can feel secure. However, it is probably necessary to let the other side know that it cannot attack Japan with impunity. Or if a foreign ship or plane crossed or flew over territory, it is not desirable for us to be ignorant of it.

Inoki: Now, as to maintenance of military strength. I am saying that it is not necessary to increase volume, that increasing defense capability is not the answer, but I would like to emphasize maintenance. If we keep within certain limits, the people would be more likely to accept it and neighboring



countries would not feel threatened. In the words of Kyoto University Professor Masaaki Takasaka, the thing is to "have the power of denial." The purpose is to stop the opponent's aggression, not to have the power to destroy him. With Japanese industrial power, it would be possible to gain the power to crush an opponent but it is necessary to make clear that we deliberately refrain from obtaining that power. There is a great difference between the international sensation that would be caused by Japan beginning to use nuclear weapons as compared to India.

Masamura: I also think that we must think in terms of minimum military power. However, there is not an absolute minimum standard, is there? It was true before the last war as well as now that, while considering our overall economic strength, we must constantly consider the balance of resource allocation for the welfare of the people and manage our resources realistically. Within these limits, as you say, Mr Inoki, maintenance of quality is necessary. But while conditions have been created so that it is possible, for the first time, to discuss defense issues in the political arena, it is unfortunate that the discussion is being carried on fanatically and resulting in confusion.

[2 Oct 80, p 2]

[Discussants: Masamichi Inoki, former president of Defense College/  
Kimihiro Masamura, professor, Senshu University]

[Text] Opposition Not Discussing Security--Inoki

National Consensus Can Be Formed--Masamura

Inoki: In the nature of things, the peoples of all nations must think about coping with emergencies. Now we have the Iran-Iraq war and Middle Eastern oil, the Persian Gulf problem. The Japanese economy is drenched in oil and for some time we will not be able to shake off our dependence on it so we should be making regular preparations for security, including energy security.

However, Japan has put this off for two reasons. The first is that Japan started a war, nominally for self-protection, in which it was soundly beaten. Recently, I was moved at watching the television drama, "The Glass Rabbit." Our people's experience of war must be remembered with seriousness. But because of it, we have developed an allergy.

Masamura: In the long history of Japan, the Japanese people have alternately jumped toward the outside enthusiastically and then pulled inward. In World War II, we attacked foreign countries with extreme recklessness, and got burned. As a result we have become extremely introverted.

Inoki: Another problem is that since we have the Mutual Security Pact with America, we think that the United States will take care of everything if an emergency arises and have given all our efforts to the economic sphere. Roughly speaking, defense expenditures were 10 percent of the total budget in 1959 and have dropped to 5.2 percent today.

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There are no other advanced industrial countries with less than 10 percent. Of these defense expenditures, 60 percent went for personnel and food supplies in 1976. This is outrageous. In contrast, expenditures for the purchase of weapons, ammunition, equipment, etc., fell to 16 percent.

The same is true for important research and development expenses. In an address at Defense College, Reona Ezaki said, "When I look at the future of a company, I am not concerned with what they are making now. Even if they are making the best products in the world right now, they may be finished in 5 years. I check to see what percent of total earnings they put into the research and development department." Compared by this standard, the advanced industrial countries invest more than 10 percent of their defense expenditures into research and development, while Japan spends around 1 percent.

Japan's lack of seriousness is striking. Why have we been so negligent? One reason is the strong American umbrella. Another if I may make a barbed comment, is that debate on defense and security was sacrificed to prolonging the life of governments and expediting business in the Diet. In any case the major opposition party has taken the position of demilitarization and neutrality and has been unenthusiastic about even discussing defense.

Masamura: You have pointed out problems of ideology and organization, and in this regard, it is necessary to think about where this response of the major opposition party came from. On the one hand, as you say, Mr Inoki, the people's experience in World War II had a great effect, and to some extent the conditions were present for working on this emotion to gain support. Another reason is that both before and after the war, the influence of Marxism-Leninism, which idealized the Soviet model of society, had a great deal of influence among the socialist opposition movement. Therefore, these people naively defined the Soviet Union and China as forces for peace. But at present, I believe that the conditions have arisen for abolishing or overcoming this somewhat irresponsible and overly introverted response to defense which developed on the basis of these conditions.

Inoki: When one speaks of a national consensus, in any country there are those who are absolute pacifists and oppose the drafting of soldiers and there are militarists. However, in our country there is a wide consensus forming, as you say, Mr Masamura, from the moderate right to the moderate left.

Masamura: One reason that it seems possible to solve or overcome this problem is that a great deal of time has passed since the war. As a matter of fact, the people born after World War II make up the majority of the population. They are even becoming a majority of the voting population. I feel the time has come not just to protest emotionally but to match theory with the real international situation. Also, the position that idealized the socialism of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has been decisively weakened by various recent developments. In the arguments made within the Socialist Party these last 2 or 3 years, for example, in the agreement made with the Komeito at the end of last year, this attitude is being revised, although very gradually.

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In public opinion polls, the majority of the people are replying that military preparedness is necessary. The majority of the people do not think that armaments should be reduced to zero. They do not support demilitarization or neutrality. But there is resistance to expansion. Thus, there is surprisingly, in a rough form, a consensus taking shape among the majority with the extreme positions being abandoned. On this foundation, conditions are emerging for a realistic discussion of defense.

[3 Oct 80, p 2]

[Discussants: Masamichi Inoki, former president of Defense College/  
Kimihiro Masamura, professor at Senshu University]

[Text] Keep Three Anti-Nuclear Principles--Inoki

Government Should Demonstrate Peace Strategy--Masamura

Inoki: Looking at our present defense capability, the morale of the Self-Defense Forces is high and discipline is good but as the result of tremendous negligence, our weapons and ammunition are obsolete. There are those who say that the Self-Defense Forces have seven times the fire power of the old army. But that claim is nonsense; it is like comparing the battle of Sekigahara to modern warfare. When considering the defense of Japan, sea and air power are more important than ground forces. If we improve just our air defense, neighboring countries will not be concerned. We cannot go on the offensive if we only strengthen our anti-submarine defense. With emphasis on these areas, it is necessary to strengthen our rear support capability.

Masamura: I basically agree, Mr Inoki, with the need to maintain a modern defense capability with what you call the power of denial. But as a prerequisite to seriously effecting this, Japan must clarify its basic strategy for peace. The government's position is not clear in this area.

Inoki: Some circles in the LDP are calling for nuclear armament. This is extremely dangerous. In view of the historical and geographical conditions of Japan, nuclear armament should not be undertaken so lightly. The three anti-nuclear principles are a sound policy and should not be revised.

Masamura: I believe our present Constitution is a system of procedures for realizing both the basic ideal of peace, in the context of the experience of World War II, and the important principle of democracy. Right after the constitutional system was established, the government of that time tried to carry out demilitarization as a means of realizing the ideal of peace after the nation had undergone the experience of war. This was also the desire of the United States. But as the international situation changed, centering around the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, many people have suddenly become realistic, and say that demilitarization and neutrality are questionable goals. However, the basic position of honoring the present Constitution must be maintained clearly.

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Inoki: This is an opinion worth careful attention. The LDP government may say it wants to amend the Constitution. That is its privilege. But first it should proclaim "respect" for it. It is no good to say that "the Constitution was forced" on us or that it is an "American system" to begin with. The entire legal system is based on the Constitution. Mr Suzuki holds the position of prime minister and Mr Okuno of minister of justice on the basis of the Constitution. Furthermore, the basis of security is internal government stability. It is important for diplomacy and for the Japanese-U.S. security system for us to have minimum power of denial and deterrent power. However, no diplomacy or defense is possible if the internal stability of the government is lost.

Masamura: If we decide to allow armament and maintenance of quality, leaving aside quantitative expansion, without the premise of honoring the Constitution, there is no telling how far the government will go. There will be a backlash and the opposition parties and people involved in peace movements will argue that we must have demilitarization and neutrality. The ambivalent attitude of the government is part of the reason that this argument appears.

Inoki: If a constitutional amendment is brought up now without due respect for the Constitution, there may well be a reenactment of the Security Pact troubles of the 60's--tremendous chaos. The foundations of security will be lost. Of course, it is foolish to require the Constitution to remain unchanged from time immemorial, but we should build on the common foundation of peace and democracy as immutable and inviolable principles.

Masamura: The attitude that we cannot allow militarization, that it is taboo, is foolish. But on the other hand, it is very wrong to discuss only militarization without clarifying the basis of political choice.

Inoki: Defense related spending makes up 5.2 percent of the budget for this fiscal year. That is one-fourth the amount for social welfare, one-half the amount for education and culture, one-third the amount for public works. Social welfare has caught up with the advanced nations and roads have improved, so the annual rate should be expanded to 20 percent and the percentage of the GNP should be brought up to 1.2 or 1.3 percent.

Masamura: The LDP is a coalition party so it is understandable for there to be varied opinions within it. However, the party must demonstrate a clear party consensus on a peace strategy based on a pro-peace position. Otherwise it will be difficult to accept even the argument for qualitative improvement of our defense capability based on realistic judgment.

Inoki: This is negligence on the part of the government and the party in power. Since it has an absolute majority in the Diet, it should do something. A special security committee has been created and if they go back to their original concern for peace and keep to it firmly, agreeing to work together for a minimum of self defense, there would be a wider consensus.

Masamura: It is probably fair to say that Japan is the only country in Asia which is making freedom and democracy function. As we manage our economic problems, we must try hard to keep them functioning. It would be very

dangerous if internal disorder arose and a majority of the people fell into despair because freedom and democracy no longer functioned. The issue of defense is important but it would be foolish to argue about the Soviet threat while letting representative government deteriorate.

Inoki: I agree completely. If we have confidence in the democratic form of government we cannot help but make ideal decisions.

[4 Oct 80, p 2]

[Discussants: Saburo Mutsui, director of the Center for American Studies/  
Makoto Momoi, director of Defense Research Institute]

[Text] [Take a Fresh Look at Japan From Outside--Mutsui]

A Foundation for International Stability--Momoi

Mutsui: The fact that I can participate in a discussion with you, Mr Momoi, although you hold a different position, is in itself proof that democracy has taken root in Japan. In discussing defense and security, the most important principle is to maintain the attitude of dialogue even if we hold different positions.

Momoi: The jumping-off point for a discussion of defense is how one's own country is to be defended. Do you consciously discuss methodology, just slide along, or leave everything to someone else? What is dangerous is to think that everything will be all right because it has been all right up to now. The "threat" does not stop with just the military aspects; it is becoming more complex. In this context, the best feature of democracy is that a variety of things can be debated freely.

Mutsui: However, perhaps because the Japanese as a race lack experience, we are behind in establishing individuality. People are unable to state their own opinions straightforwardly. They rely on groups to speak and act. In the defense issue as well, it is necessary to bring the debate back to the individual level.

Momoi: You say there is no consciousness of "individuality," but some phenomena of individualism exist such as taking no interest in public affairs. This is a problem in awareness of defense as well.

Mutsui: That is right. In a poll, 80 percent replied that military power is necessary to defend the country but less than 15 percent said that either they or their sons were willing to respond to a draft. There is a definite gap here in which the defense issue is not seen as having personal application. In extreme form, this kind of thinking would lead to an argument for bringing in a foreign legion.

Momoi: The Japanese, compared to people of other countries, lack the historical experience of defending their homeland. China, the Soviet Union, all the countries of Europe have continually fought enemies in their own territory

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and driven them out, had their country occupied and taken it back. The only time Japan has been attacked was in the Genko era. In the internal wars of the Sengoku era (Era of the Country at War), the warriors had the main role, and the farmers, artisans and merchants looked at the fighting as someone else's affair.

Mutsui: America and Europe both have multiracial populations and they take in refugees. Although there are refugees coming out of Asia, Japan tries to get off with just sending money. We say we have an open society, that we have become internationalized. But as Japan became a great economic power, I believe the Japanese mentality has become isolationist.

Momoi: The Japanese do not have the habit of looking at Japan from the outside. Because they lack an international outlook, they go to extremes with it comes to conflict. They have a great sense of crisis and then are overcome by a feeling of powerlessness.

Mutsui: That is why the idea of the "Soviet threat" builds up so suddenly. Up to July 1971, China was a potential enemy of Japan. But when detente began between America and China, it became "not a threat," "actually a friendly country." It is important to examine the idea of the Soviet threat more carefully and concretely to see if it has substance, or if, at bottom, it is like that of China.

Momoi: After the establishment of NATO in 1949, America switched to viewing the Soviet Union as a potential enemy. Even in the era of detente, that view was not essentially discarded. Even in the isolated case of Japan, there was the MIG 25 incident and the recent nuclear submarine problem. In addition, the seizure of fishing boats has become an everyday occurrence. Going back further, there was the state of affairs right after the war. Because of this sort of thing, the Soviet Union is seen somehow as an ominous country.

Mutsui: Japan has been handled rather roughly by the United States, but basically, we are in alliance and there have not been many problems. That is not the case with the Soviet Union.

Momoi: There is a great deal of interest in the present war between Iraq and Iran because oil is involved. The security debate must begin here, before we discuss whether the Soviets are coming or not.

Mutsui: In recent years, the economy has, to a tremendous extent, gone beyond previous alignments, and interdependent relationships are growing. American banks are loaning a large amount of money to the Soviet Union. Therefore, I believe it is meaningless to discuss which country is going to attack without being concerned with what international order should be maintained.

Momoi: You cannot just say it is meaningless. Unless you are saying that it is meaningless to limit the discussion to that alone. But to add something to your comment, Japanese security cannot be established without stability in a global sense. Things must be transported in. People must move about. Products must be sent out. There will be trouble if we do not maintain a

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relationship with the areas where these routes of travel pass and keep some sort of balance between regions. Also, the ability to restore balance within the country is important--both politically and economically.

Mutsui: I am not sure what is meant by an overall guarantee of security. But if it includes economic security, what do the people of the developing countries think about it? They have come to feel the Japanese economic presence itself as a great pressure. It is important to build relationships of equality so this pressure is not felt. For this purpose, we need to take a fresh look at Japan from without.

[5 Oct 80, p 2]

[Discussants: Saburo Mutsui, director of the Center for American Studies/  
Makoto Momoi, director of the Defense Research Institute]

[Text] Serious Feeler to the Soviets--Momoi

Find True Intent of American Demands--Mutsui

Momoi: Japan is often referred to as one of the Western powers. The Japanese tend to think by dividing things up or lumping them together. That is especially true in international relations. In the past we thought of the world in divisions--Asia, Northeast Asia, the Japanese mainland. But for some reason that has changed to a global sense, a sense of Japan as part of the West. There are two reasons for this.

One is the expansion of the Japanese economic presence on a worldwide scale. In connection with this, it was inevitable that interdependence, especially in energy, would develop. Furthermore, in the past, the decisions made by the advanced industrial countries maintained the world order. However, since the oil shock of 1973, the countries known as the Third World, especially those with resources, have been making stronger claims. If we do not go along with them, the global order and the system will be immobilized. Therefore, the idea developed that the Western nations must stick together to deal with the Third World and Japan came to be considered economically as a part of the West.

Mutsui: Since the period just after World War II, Japan has been acting as one of the free world countries. But even as a part of the free world, it has quite a different foreign policy than what we see in France and Germany. Both France and West Germany are making their own moves. However, Japan, and this is true in the recent defense debate, is caught up in what percent of the GNP is enough [for defense].

Momoi: To continue with my previous suggestion, the other reason is that we have started to be aware of ourselves as one of the Western nations militarily. Last April, the London International Strategy Institute published the statement that the Soviet Union has strategic interest in a belt region from Norway in the West, through Afghanistan in the South, and stretching to the Northern Territories of Japan in the East. In response to the Soviet Union's global movement, the West has begun to have a sense of solidarity.

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Japan must operate on a global level economically or it cannot survive. And we have come to think that Japan must deal with Soviet military movements--not calling it aggression--as a part of the West, or overall security, including economic security, cannot be maintained. However, we have not yet come to the point of feeling that some obligations are involved if Japan becomes part of the West. From the viewpoint of the West, it may seem that the Japanese are only thinking of themselves.

Mutsui: This is probably connected with varying views of the Soviet threat. It is a fact that there is a common international awareness of the Soviet moves in the last 4 or 5 years. But even in this, a difference can be seen in the response of Europe and Japan. In view of long historical experience, Western Europe is in danger of having the people of its countries wiped out if the present relationship between Eastern and Western Europe is not maintained. Therefore, it moves toward accommodation with the Soviets. There is resistance to the placement of neutron bombs in Western Europe. Having them would provoke the Soviet Union. Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany and President Giscard d'Estaing of France are trying to maintain detente through talks with the Soviet Union. That is why they attempt to build loopholes even in the anti-Soviet sanctions related to Afghanistan. However, Japan is not thinking seriously about how it will maintain a relationship of peaceful coexistence in its policy toward the Soviets.

When, internationally, the arms race is becoming more intense and the survival of mankind is in question, it is frankly very sad to see a peaceful country like Japan not even sending out serious feelers to see what initiatives it can take.

Momoi: There are some who take the American demand for Japan to expand its defense capability as outside pressure. But I do not think this constitutes outside pressure. It would be a matter of concern if the Japanese people feel that they have been forced to accept excessive American demands, but I do not think that is the case. There is also the question of whether it is merely pointing out Japan's past negligence. More important, even if pressure was applied, is determining what part of the U.S. Government it came from and to what extent. What about the U.S. Congress? What is the relationship with the economy and commerce? I do not want to take it as the demand simply of "America." In fact, I think Japan sometimes makes a scapegoat of America as the bad guy.

Mutsui: Whether there was outside pressure or not, I believe there was a wish or desire expressed by the present American government for Japan to expand its defense capability. But domestically, it is undeniable that a demand was made by business circles which included economics as well as politics, not just for military strength but the know-how and weapons market that accompanies it. As in a 1974 Brookings report made in America, there is a school of thought that Japan should arm with light, non-nuclear weapons. This may not be convincing now that the world situation has changed, but it is still deeply rooted in the trend of thinking of the American Government.

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[6 Oct 80, p 2]

[Discussants: Saburo Mutsui, director of the Center for American Studies/  
Makoto Momoi, director of the Defense Research Institute]

[Text] A Deeper Understanding of Military Power--Momoi

Military Buildup Is a Waste of Money--Mutsui

Momoi: In the changing international situation, we should analyze the information and get a rational fix on the military threat while thinking how to obtain security most cheaply and effectively. We should think about particular countries comprehensively and consider what they desire from Japan. And in doing so it is good to reflect on where Japan has been negligent and whether we are not doing something that will bring ridicule.

Mutsui: The idea that Japan should be lightly armed is found in Asia as well. If Japan strengthens its military, how will the surrounding countries take it when even before this we have been accused of economic invasion? There is a danger of disturbing the status quo in Asia. Therefore, I think that expansion of military power does not have positive significance. The danger of negative results is great.

Momoi: It is nice that our defensive strength even if "light," is not denied (laugh). However, this should not be taken as an expansion of the Japanese presence toward the outside or toward Asia. Looking at the present international situation, we see that the power of the United States has clear limits. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, can extend its hand very far with a combination of naval and air power. When this happens, America, in terms of national interest, cannot keep its presence balanced throughout the world. It moves its fleet to the Persian Gulf in the Middle East, as a counterpresence to the Soviets, and the Pacific is left relatively under-protected. To the extent that it does not create suspicion in other countries, it is not important to keep our own country secure in terms of its involvement in international politics?

Mutsui: The concept of military balance is based on a number of fictions. The phrase overall deterrent power has come into use. But looking at it in extreme terms, has there ever been a balance between East and West since the war? No matter what era you look at, this issue is confused. This was true for the Vietnam War and there are many other things that cannot be explained in terms of military balance. Around 1955 or 1956, you translated the book "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy." Actually, Kissinger abandoned this idea after he wrote the book.

Momoi: A good feature of great nations, especially America, is that it is always rethinking its attitudes and correcting mistakes.

Mutsui: In response to new information, changes are made easily. George Ball who was responsible for negotiating SALT II, said nonchalantly "Let's set a ceiling here for strategic nuclear weapons. America has already reached it

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but it will be a goal for the Soviet Union since there is quite a gap between America and the Soviets. In numbers, the Soviet Union is ahead, but they are critically behind in electronics. Their submarines are also behind." So Ball and Vance (former secretary of state) were not accepted in the Carter administration and they resigned. Therefore, even within the United States there is plenty of trial and error in thinking about defense problems and the approach to Europe and Japan.

Momoi: I did not use the word balance because I do not like the word much. It leads to misunderstanding. For example, if we count numbers, we are referring to passive balance only, just one area. The problem is how that will change when things move, change form, or are worn out or used up. The important thing is political or psychological balance. Whether balance exists or not is determined not only by what happens when fighting starts. You must also decide whether under the present circumstances it would be better not to go to war but rather choose some political alternative or choose detente. By observing, obtaining information, thinking. In these areas a psychological balance is involved.

Mutsui: Today, both East and West have entered an era of tremendous military expansion. If this rate of military expansion continues, it not only creates the conditions leading to war. From the point of view of improving the economy and welfare, in the broad sense of these terms, it is a terrible waste of resources.

In the final document selected by consensus in the United Nations special session on arms reduction, it was clearly stated that although military preparedness used to be helpful in guaranteeing national security, in this age of nuclear weapons, arms reduction is what leads to national security. We should not forget that the survival of mankind is being threatened.

Momoi: This is fine as a general argument, but the international situation will never be stabilized by simply shouting arms reduction again and again. Military power actually exists. There are just two issues, how to use it and how not to use it. The concept of arms control derives from this. If all countries would discipline themselves and use military power only in self defense and not in international conflicts, there would be a greater degree of stability. Also, it is necessary to determine what each country thinks about military power and how it uses it or does not use it to achieve political ends.

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

DEVELOPMENT OF FULL-AUTOMATIC ION ETCHING DEVICE

Tokyo BUSINESS JAPAN in English Nov 80 pp 96, 97

[Text]

"TRIE," a full-automatic, reaction-type ion etching device, capable of performing high-precision etching below the 1 micron line width has been developed by Toshiba Corporation and Tokuda Seisakusho K.K., a Toshiba subsidiary. Tokuda will undertake production and sale of the new device, while Toshiba will apply it to the mass production of high-density LSI.

TRIE is the first application of the anisotropic etching process to mass production. It permits precision processing below the two microns line width on a mass production scale, which was impracticable with previous isotropic etching processes such as the solution process and the chemical dry etching process. It is also applicable to the production of super-density LSI with 250 Kbit memories.

The working principle of the new ion etching process is as follows: Reactive gas is introduced into the vacuum etching chamber and converted into plasma through high frequency impressed on the electrode placed on the side of the wafer to be processed. Cations contained in the plasma are accelerated by the negative potential produced in the electrode through high frequency, collide with the wafer and etch the latter by accompanying chemical reaction.

The mass production plant features the load lock system for high-precision optimal control of the evacuation and gas pressure, the pressure control valves, the exhaust duct of new structures, the transfer system between the wafer cassette and the etching chamber for inserting and taking out of wafers, and the etching process control. All these units are automatically controlled by microcomputers.

The standard price is ¥45 million. The maker expects a sale of 30 units including exports in the initial year.

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